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In the early part of the XIX century, American politics had a local flavor. Power resided most often 
in the county or town, sometimes in the state, and only rarely in Washington, D.C. (Dahl 1989; 
Young 1966). Weak parties proved incapable of articulating national political identities and 
Congress operated in large part reactively to the given issues of the day. While a true national 
stage for politics would not emerge until the end of the century (Clemens 1997) the political 
divisions of the 1820s posed a severe challenge for the newly formed Republic. The dangers of 
factionalism so clearly spelled out by James Madison in Federalist #10 appeared very concretely 
in the second decade of the nineteenth century for example, when bitter fights ruled the life of 
Congress.  
 
Yet despite the political fragmentation that characterized this period, by 1830, the contours of a 
national political stage had emerged (Formisano 1983). For certain, the process of political 
consolidation that created the stage for national politics could not be accredited to the new parties 
that formed from the ashes of the Republicans and the Federalists. The Whigs and the 
Democrats continued to be weak organizations as were their predecessors—in 1836, for example 
the Whig ʻpartyʼ had at least 4 presidential candidates (Formisano 1974). Historians have looked 
at the underlying social and economic processes that from the early nineteenth century began 
transforming the United States from an agricultural country to an industrial super power in order to 
explain the emergence of national politics amidst weak parties (Marshall 1967). Political scholars 
have instead argued that consolidation of politics on the national stage emerged from the 
presidential campaigns that created awareness of the regions from which candidates emerged 
(McCormick 1966). In this paper, however, we set these underlying processes firmly in the 
background and focus on a more proximate cause for the ideological consolidation that led to the 
emergence of a national political stage—Congressmenʼs living arrangements.  
 
Our argument is simple. Congressmen who lived together in what were known as 
boardinghouses had more opportunities to interact with each other and, therefore, to influence 
each otherʼs opinions (Bogue and Marlaire 1975). The fact that Washington, D.C. at the time was 
largely a town “under construction” that offered few alternatives to the routines imposed on 
Congressmen by their jobs magnified the impact of the residential informal networks. These 
networks, more than the parties or the presidential campaigns, became the basis for the 
formation of a national political stage (Young 1966). 
 
That a venue—the boardinghouses in our case—rather than a party, or system of parties, could 
become the basis for the consolidation of a political system is not surprising. Parties themselves 
are often born out of venues with ideology following the more or less lucky first gathering. For 
example, in writing about the Jacobins of 1789, Maurice Duverger argued that members of this 
party gathered together because they all came from the same region of France. They became an 
ideological group, a party, only afterwards, when the French Assembly was transferred from 
Versailles to Paris. “This time, no room in a café being available, the leading spirits hired the 
refectory of a convent, and it was under the name of this convent that they were to become 
famous in history” (1954: xxv). In this account, the relationship between political opinions and 
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political parties is the reverse of what most casual observers imagine. In revolutionary France, 
representatives got together first and then recognized their common interests and ideological 
similarities. This paper claims that boardinghouses—not cafes or monasteries—played a similar 
role in post-revolutionary American politics. The result of the discovering of common interests 
across multiple localities led to the emergence on the national stage of the North / South divide—
the main cleavage of national politics during the nineteenth century (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). 
 
In this paper therefore we do not model the formation of the American second party system. 
Instead, we are interested in analyzing the underlying institutional process of ideological 
consolidation that sustained the emergence of the key cleavage of American politics—the division 
between Northerners and Southerners. We ask the following question—given the fact that 
American parties remained weak organizations, which institutions generated the structuring of 
positions between a Northern bloc of congressmen and its equivalent in the South so that their 
political differences consolidated on the national stage?  
 
Of course, we do not want to fool anybody—Washington, D.C. was not (and perhaps still is not), 
Paris. No cafes existed within the perimeter of the city during the period of our analysis. James 
Sterling Young reports that when the government arrived in Washington, D.C. there were only 
109 permanent structures (brick and stone) and that the War of 1812 only made things worse 
(1966). What existed, however, and what political scientists have largely overlooked, were 
boardinghouses, places where Congressmen lived while serving in Congress. These 
boardinghouses became the basis for the formation of informal networks of Congressmen and, 
our evidence shows, for the recognition of common interests above those of local politics. The 
boardinghouse was the institution underlying the emergence of the North / South cleavage in the 
first part of the nineteenth century. 
 
We will show evidence that boardinghouses exerted influence on the individual voting behavior of 
Congressmen. In particular, we will show that it was only when Congressmen from the South 
lived with other Congressmen from the South that they realized their commonality of interests. 
The same occurred in the case of Northerners. The homogeneity of the residential networks 
exerted political pressure on Congressmen to vote in alignment because it reinforced the 
emergence of a dominant perspective. Further, we will use a particular aspect of our data—
Congressmen that moved between boardinghouses at the end of first session—to separate the 
impact of selection from that of political influence. Rather than choosing to live together on the 
basis of common regional interests, Congressmen recognized these interests because they lived 
together. 
 
While we have evidence showing that boardinghouses influenced the voting of Congressmen, 
and that the direction of this influence reinforced the North / South divide, we are still in the 
process of coding and analyzing more data for showing the ideological consolidation at the 
national level that boardinghouses generated.  Thus, the conclusions that this paper draws are 
necessarily tentative. 
 
 
Politics in Washington, D.C., circa 1820s  
 
Congressmen of the early nineteenth century hated Washington, D.C. as much as contemporary 
Congressmen hate it today. In those days, however, the hate for the new capital was not just 
another rhetorical trick in the politicianʼs bag. The city had very minimal infrastructure and, for 
example, the low ground in between the White House and Capitol Hill was, literally, a swamp! At 
the beginning of the century, very few buildings existed. Young writes: “When the government 
arrived in 1800, only 109 “permanent” structures (brick or stone) stood in all of Washington, to 
house the 500 families already residing there and an additional 300 civilian members of the 
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government, many of them with families of their own.  The commissioner then reported 372 
dwellings as ʻhabitable,ʼ but, as a cabinet officer noted, ʻmost of them are small miserable hutsʼ” 
(1966: 22). The war with England in 1812 only made things worse. When Congressmen returned 
to the city in 1814, they found the situation so desperate that talks of abandoning Washington, 
D.C. for good became dominant. Indeed the House came within nine votes to decide in that 
direction. 
 
In this unforgiving environment, Congressmen stuck together. In the early part of the century, the 
great majority of Congressmen were part of boardinghouses, also known as messes. Young 
reports that messmates took their meals together, lived together and spent most of their leisure 
time together.  Messes were largely established along regional lines, yet states were rarely 
unified in a single mess.  Messes had up to 30 members. While the number of Congressmen 
residing in boardinghouses progressively declined with the passing of time, it remained a salient 
phenomenon until the middle of the nineteenth century.  
 
Undoubtedly, Congressmen thought living in Washington, D.C. was onerous also because of the 
distance of national politics from the seat of their real power—the county or the state. In the first 
two decades of the century, Congress more resembled organized chaos than a functioning 
political institution (Formisano 1983). There were no formally recognized party leaders and 
seniority as a basis for political rank was very weak. Fueling this lack of leadership stood deeply 
engrained political practices.  For example, Sarah Binder reports that, although by the 1820s 
referral of bills to standing committees would become far more routine, ʻJeffersonianʼ attitudes 
toward the legislative process continued to have legitimacy: “…subjects were debated on the floor 
in the Committee of the Whole before being sent to ad hoc select committees for drafting as a bill” 
(1995: 1096). For a few Congressmen, the weak institutional setting that Congress offered and 
the precarious infrastructures of the city proved too much to bear—resigning the national post in 
order to return to local politics was a common practice in the 1820s.  
 
National politics was not only a dispersive environment but was also very heterogeneous. 
Disparate issues dominated Congressional life during the 1820s, such as, for example: (a) the 
composition of a delegation to the Panama Congress (19th Congress); (b) military appropriations 
(20th Congress); (c) the Indian Removal Act (21st Congress). On these issues and on several 
relevant others that we do not report for lack of space, Congressmen sorted themselves out on 
the basis of locally, state-centered interests rather than using a national outlook. The byproduct of 
this was that politics at the Federal level had a muddled ideological structure. For example, during 
the 18th Congress the W-NOMINATE score for all rollcalls (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) returns an 
ideological space fractured along five dimensions. Things improved marginally during the 19th 
Congress.  
 
In sum, national politics in the 1820s appeared very weakly organized, with Congressmen mostly 
loyal to their local interests and anxious to leave the Capital as soon as possible. However, 
because the majority of Congressmen lived together, small communities formed. By spending 
time together in boardinghouses Congressmen became aware of similarities across regional 
differences and, in a manner very similar to the emergence of parties in Europe (Sartori 1976), 
they developed a common ideological ground. In the remaining part of the paper we will show that 
this process of ideological consolidation at the national level led to the emergence of the 
North/South cleavage. 
 
 
Data 
 
The 19th Congress marks the beginning of our period of analysis. We chose this starting point 
because it is traditionally considered the institutional birth of the second party system. Using 
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several different sources, we constructed a database with all Congressmen from the 19th to the 
26th Congress. First, we coded the information of where Congressmen resided in Washington DC 
from Goldman and Young (1973), which lists the names of the boardinghouses for each session 
and the names of the people that resided there. 
 
Next, we looked at ICPSR study 3371, Database of Congressional Historical Statistics 1789-1989, 
for biographies about each Congressman. We also gathered rollcall data from voteview.com, 
which has been curated by Howard Rosenthal and Keith Poole. Finally, we pieced this 
information together with committee assignments taken from Charles Stewart's website at MIT.  
 
For each session in the period from 1825 to 1840 (the 19th to the 26th Congresses) we know the 
identity of each Congressmanʼs boarding mates and their voting records. Three things are worth 
noting about boardinghouses. First, the number of Congressmen in each boardinghouse changed 
session by session. This is because other guests, non-Congressmen, also lived in these 
establishments and occupied some of the rooms. In our data, we do not have the identity of these 
other residents. 
 
Second, the number of boardinghouses appearing in the directory also changes session by 
session. Some boardinghouses remain in the directory for all of the sessions while others appear 
for few sessions or for a single session. This source of variation is, however, less problematic 
than the previous one because we know exactly when Congressmen lived in private dwellings, 
that is, not in a boardinghouse. Our data include the residence of all Congressmen for each 
session, regardless of their type of residence. Therefore, although the number of boardinghouses 
changed with each session we are confident that our database includes all the boardinghouses 
active during the period 1825-1840. 
 
The third important piece of information regarding boardinghouses is that a subset of 
Congressmen moved at the end of each session from one boardinghouse to another. Given that 
we know their voting records before and after the move, this switching of boardinghouses allows 
us to create a quasi-experimental scenario for untangling the impact of selection and influence. 
We will come back to this point more precisely in the hypothesis section but the analysis of 
Congressmen that moved between boardinghouses (movers) makes possible the development of 
a strong causal argument about the effect that residential informal networks of Congressmen 
generated. 
 
Despite the richness of information contained in our database, we have no direct data on the 
network of relationships between Congressmen that lived in the same boardinghouse. We do not 
have proof, for example, if Congressman X became a friend with Congressman Y while living in 
the same boardinghouse. Therefore, we assume that boardinghouses provided a natural locus for 
the formation of informal networks. The conditions in Washington, D.C. described above 
potentially exacerbated the salience of boardinghouses in creating informal networks because 
few places for local gathering existed at this time in the city. Further, historical secondary 
evidence confirms our intuition. Congressmen living in the same boardinghouse had frequent 
interactions with each other. In light of all of this, we think that our decision to use boardinghouses 
in order to capture informal networks of Congressmen is very plausible. 
 
Given the lack of infrastructure in DC, the self-reported addresses for the boardinghouses have 
several inconsistencies. It was sometimes difficult to determine whether boardinghouses with 
similar names appearing in successive sessions were in fact the same residence. In order to 
disambiguate these cases, we did our best to uniquely identify the location of boardinghouses 
using a historical map of the city. This helped to resolve most of the ambiguous cases. When in 
doubt, we treated similar boardinghouses as separate residences, so as not to give them a false 
persistence through time. A possible consequence of this strategy is to suppress the effects of 
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boardinghouse influence on movers, as some of those movers perhaps did not actually move. As 
this suppression would be counter to our hypotheses, any results we find may in actuality be 
stronger than the reported values. 
 
The table below reports briefly some of the information about boardinghouses for each Congress 
included in the analysis. The empty rows are those for which we are still in the process of coding 
data. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics about boarding houses 
 
Two things are readily spotted. The first is that the majority of Congressmen resided in 
boardinghouses. The second is that almost half of the Congressmen moved between sessions. 
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
The precarious state of Washington, D.C.ʼs infrastructure made the boardinghouses one of the 
few venues where Congressmen could convene informally and socialize. Although we do not 
have data on the informal relationships among Congressmen, we take the boardinghouses as 
proxies for these relationships. Congressmen living together shared and often discussed political 
ideas or the issues of the day. Away from home, boardinghouses created small communities for 
their residents. 
 
Sociologists have shown the importance of informal networks in the functioning of organizations 
and institutions (Meyer and Rowan 1977). More recently, political scientists have also turned their 
attention toward informal networks to analyze political behavior in Congress (Fowler 2006) and 
the formation of political parties (Schwartz 1990). In line with this research, our broad hypothesis 
is that the networks created by the boardinghouses in the nineteenth century influenced the 
political behavior of their residents. In the remaining part of this section, we refine this broad 
hypothesis in three directions: first, by specifying the mechanism through which the 
boardinghouse exerted influence on Congressmen; second, by stating the political consequences 
of this pressure; and third, by stating a causal argument about how this mechanism operated.  
 
Boardinghouses influenced political behavior because they created informal networks of people 
living there. They were, in this sense, more than just a place where Congressmen lived; they 
formed the basis of small communities. Because of this, the political profiles of Congressmen 
residing in the same boardinghouse can be used to discern the mechanism that exerted pressure. 
In particular, we hypothesize that the greater the number of people with a similar profile living 
together—being from the same region, party, profession, etc—the stronger the amount of political 
pressure of the informal network on the individual political behavior. Thus, 
 
 H1: Larger and more homogeneous boardinghouses exerted greater  
pressure on the voting behavior of their residents. 
 
Given the salience of local, state-centered politics, recognizing common interests across different 
locales meant that Congressmen from the South or the North would vote more with their 
colleagues on either side of the two blocs rather than across. Because it was by living together 
that Congressmen realized their common interests outside of local towns and counties, our 
hypothesis is that territorially homogeneous boardinghouses led to the emergence of the North / 
South cleavage on the national stage. Whereas voting independently of larger groupings would 
imply the persistence of a local outlook—a Southern Congressman ignoring regional orientation 
as a meaningful distinction, for example—voting with oneʼs own side would mean the emergence 
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of a national stage for politics—a Southern Congressman recognizing common interests with 
other Southern Congressmen.  
 
H2: Congressmen living in territorially homogeneous boardinghouses voted as to 
reinforce the North / South cleavage, everything else equal. 
  
Yet, in order to causally show that the emergence of the territorial cleavage was a consequence 
of living arrangements, a closer look at how Congressmen selected boardinghouses as their 
residences is necessary. It may be the case that the consequence of pressure on each 
Congressmen to vote in alignment with other boardinghouse members was that Congressmen 
voted differently from what they would have voted had they lived somewhere else (or alone). 
However, it could also be the case that Congressmen chose to live with people that they thought 
were politically similar. Network analysts call this phenomenon homophily—the tendency to 
become friend with people similar to us (Watts, Dodds, and Newman 2002). If homophily was at 
play, the pressure of the boardinghouses would operate to reinforce the political opinions of its 
residents. That is, Congressmen would select where to live and, in our implicit model, who to 
befriend, on the basis of the political behavior of other residents. In such case, our argument 
about boardinghouse pressure would need to be inverted: Congressmen selected boarding 
houses on the basis of the communality of interests with the other tenants. 
 
To untangle a pure influence effect from the issue of selection, we look more closely at the voting 
records of the group of Congressmen that moved between sessions for each Congress in our 
data. If movers selected the second boardinghouse on the basis of the political behavior of its 
residents, the Congressmen who lived in the selected boardinghouse during the previous session 
are expected to have a political profile similar to that of the mover. Instead, if movers selected the 
boardinghouse irrespective of the political profiles of its residents, we expect not to see 
similarities between the profiles of its residents and the mover during the previous session. 
Further, if informal networks exerted political influence, we expect that the moverʼs voting records 
correlate highly with the records of Congressmen at the destination boardinghouse during the 
current session. More formally: 
 
H3a (homophily): If a Congressman selected the boardinghouse to move to on the basis 
of the political profile of its residents, a positive and strong correlation exists between the 
voting record of the mover and the voting records of the members of the destination 
boardinghouse during the first session. 
 
H3b (influence): If the pressure of informal networks caused a Congressman to change 
his voting behavior, the voting records of the movers will be weakly correlated with that of 
Congressmen living at the destination boardinghouse at the end of the first session, and 
strongly correlated with the voting records of Congressmen living at the destination 
boardinghouse at the end of the second session. 
 
 
Statistical Model 
 
We focused the analysis on the North / South division. For each session we calculated the 
percentage that either a Southerner congressmen voted with the North or vice-versa. We 
calculated this percentage using roll calls for all congressmen. For example, if a Southerner voted 
to pass a particular bill along with the majority of Northerners, and the majority of Southerners 
voted against it, then that individual was considered to have voted with the other region.  We then 
took the number of all such occurrences for each member over the total number of votes in a 
particular session, and created a variable for each Congressman in each session that ranged 
between 0 and 1. This became the dependent variable in our analysis. 
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The fact that politics was deeply local was our starting assumption in developing this measure. If 
Congressmen focused exclusively locally, they would be indifferent to the territorial cleavage. 
Conversely, if Congressmen developed a sense of their common interests, they would tend to 
vote significantly less with the opposite side. In line with historical literature (Levine 1992), we 
discarded as anachronistic the fact that voting in opposition with oneʼs own bloc would indicate 
the emergence of a pan-American political stage. Thus, considering the salience of local politics 
at the time and in line with H2, we interpreted voting with the opposite side not as evidence of 
ideological structuring at the national level but on the contrary, as evidence of weak national 
politics. 
 
We considered our dependent variable as capturing a latent individualʼs propensity to see politics 
as either informed mainly by local, state-centered issues or by national issues. This latent 
dimension can take values greater than 1 if a Congressmanʼs political orientation is strongly 
towards the other region, or smaller than 0 if a Congressman saw communality of interests with 
his own region. In this latter case, politics at the national level would result in the emergence of 
the North / South cleavage. Because of the nature of our dependent variable, we treated the 
interval between 0 and 1 as a two-sided censoring estimation problem and employed a Tobit 
model with left and right censoring for our analysis (Tobin 1958). More formally the model we 
estimated using the VGAM package in R was the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where yi* is the latent individual propensity observed only within the interval 0, 1 and xi is a vector 
of explanatory variables, beta is a vector of unknown parameters and ui is the disturbance term. 
 
We used control variables at the individual level and at the level of the boardinghouses. At the 
individual level we coded a series of dummy variables (being in the Jackson Party, coming from a 
slave state, being a lawyer or businessman, having military experience, being a college graduate, 
being a new congressman, being a member of the House) and the individualʼs age. At the level of 
the boardinghouse we used the same control variables but in the form of proportions, i.e., the 
proportion of Jacksonians living in the same boardinghouse, the percentage of college graduates 
living in the same boardinghouse, etc. We also controlled for the size of the boardinghouse, i.e., 
how many congressmen lived together during a given session. 
 
 
The mechanism of social pressure 
 
The relevance of the pressure mechanism is independent of its political consequences. A 
boardinghouse could have reinforced the regional identity or it could have generated a new cross 
regional, more national, political outlook. What we care to show in this part of the analysis, is the 
mechanism through which this pressure was exerted. According to H1, the pressure of the 
informal networks depended on the homogeneity of the boardinghouses. With respect to our 
dependent variable, and controlling for individual attributes, we expected that a more 
homogeneous boardinghouse would generate more pressure toward shaping a Congressmanʼs 
vote, irrespective of its direction (H1). A positive effect would mean a greater likelihood of voting 
with the opposite side, that is, of thinking that the larger aggregates South or North donʼt matter 
much compared to local issues. In this case, national politics remains weak. A negative sign 
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would mean a smaller likelihood of voting with the opposite side, that is, a greater tendency of 
seeing similarity of interests with Congressmen from the South or the North. In such a case, 
national politics would emerge as a relevant stage for Congressmen. H2 predicts a significant and 
negative effect of the boardinghouses in that they would operate toward making the Northerners 
(or Southerners) more aware of their common interests across states, counties and towns. 
 
We tested this hypothesis for each session of Congress between 1825 and 1833 and also for the 
two sessions of the 24th Congress (1835-1837). We are currently in the process of coding more 
data for the 23rd, 25th and 26th Congresses (see Table 1 above). The table below reports the 
results of the Tobit model for the 1st session of the 22nd Congress as an example. The same 
analysis was repeated for all the sessions in our data.  
 
Table 2: Tobit model for the first session of 22nd Congress 
 
In Model 1, two factors are significant: being a Jacksonian and being newly elected. Both factors 
operate toward decreasing the national outlook (greater likelihood of voting in opposition, see the 
positive sign for the coefficients) of the Congressman. However, when controlling for the effect of 
boardinghouse, both effects wash out. Model 2 shows that informal networks made prevalently of 
college graduates and newly elected Congressmen significantly altered individual political 
behavior.  While the latter factor continued to decrease the development of a more national 
outlook, the former factor made Congressmen more tied territorially. Model 2 confirms the fact 
that political parties were very weak institutions at the time—once controlling for boardinghouses, 
the effect of being a Jacksonian disappears. 
 
It is Model 3 that displays the most interesting results. The territorial division between North and 
South emerges very strongly but only once we factor in the interactions. A Congressman from the 
North living with many other Northerners had -.176 less chances of voting with the other side and 
therefore it was that much more likely to see his local interests in line with that of other 
Congressmen from the North (notice that the sign of the coefficient is reversed because we are 
looking at percentage of Northerners, rather than percentage of Southerners as it is presented in 
the table). This voting pattern is in line with what we predicted in H2. Similarly, a Southern 
Congressman living in a boardinghouse with many other Southerners had a greater chance of 
voting with the interests of other Southerners in mind (compare the magnitude of the negative 
interaction coefficient with that of “Slave State” at the boarding house level). 
 
The boardinghouse pressure toward pulling Congressman apart on the North / South divide was 
further reinforced with respect to other characteristics—being a college graduate and a 
businessman. The only counterbalancing effect happened when considering age—older 
Congressmen living together tended to be more locally oriented compared to networks made of 
younger Congressmen. More relevant for the analysis, the size of the boardinghouse emerged to 
be significant in Model 3. Larger boardinghouses were more likely to push for a national vote than 
smaller ones, all things being equal. The significant effects reported in Model 3 were operating 
through the mechanisms that H2 predicted.  
 
While Table 2 confirms that the greater homogeneity of the informal networks was the 
mechanism that created pressure, it also strongly confirms that boardinghouses were crucial for 
the emergence of a key divide in American national politics—the North / South divide. The picture 
below reports the predicted probabilities of a territorial vote by the percentage of Northerners or 
Southerners in the informal networks. Both lines have a statistically significant and negative slope, 
with the line for the case of a Southern Congressman steeper than for a Northerner.  
 
Figure 1: Tobit model. Predicted probabilities 
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The effect of homogeneity at least with respect to territory emerged at the interaction level for 
both North and South but was stronger for the latter case. We repeated this analysis for all the 
other Congresses currently in our data. The table below focuses on the effect for the South and 
shows that the interaction effects operated in the same direction as shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 3: Interaction effects 
 
Because for the case for boardinghouses made of mostly Northerners the interpretation of the 
findings is the same, we do not report a separate table. In both cases, informal networks created 
pressure through homogeneity and operated toward creating awareness of common interests for 
Congressmen from the South and the North, respectively. More than parties, Table 3 suggests, 
the institutional foundation for the North / South split that would become the main axis of 
American politics was in the informal networks developed on the basis of living arrangements. 
The next section explores this idea in causal terms: Did the pressure mechanism cause 
Congressmen to recognize their similarities or were boardinghouses selected on the basis of pre-
existing common interests? 
 
 
A causal argument: The institutional foundation of the North / South divide 
 
A large subset of Congressmen switched boardinghouses between sessions of Congress. This 
switch creates a quasi-experimental situation because our database contains information not only 
about the movers before and after the switch, but also about the voting records of the residents in 
both boardinghouses, the one at the origin (first session) and the one at the destination (second 
session). 
 
Hypotheses H3a & b pose opposite scenarios. H3a states that if homophily were at play, the 
correlation of the voting record of the mover with the voting records of the Congressmen in the 
destination boardinghouse at the end of first session will necessarily be high. Conversely, H3b 
implies that if Congressmen moved for idiosyncratic reasons, a weak correlation would exist 
between the voting records of the mover and those of Congressmen at the destination 
boardinghouse at the end of the first session. More importantly, H3b states that if informal 
networks caused Congressmen to vote differently, we would expect a discrepancy in the voting 
records of the movers before and after they switched boardinghouses. 
 
The table below provides evidence of the fact that homophily did not affect moversʼ choices of 
boardinghouses. At the same time, the table provides support for the hypothesis that 
boardinghouse pressure caused a change in voting behavior. 
 
Table 4: Voting correlations for movers 
 
The first two columns report the average correlation coefficient for the movers with Congressmen 
living in the origin boardinghouse and with Congressmen in the destination boardinghouse. For all 
the cases for which we have data, the correlation coefficients in the second column are lower 
than in the first. This indicates a lack of support for H3a. 
 
Columns 3 and 4 instead provide evidence in support of H3b. Influence operated to increase the 
correlation between Congressmen in the destination boardinghouse as compared to 
Congressmen in the original boardinghouse. Correlations in column 4 are always greater than 
those in column 3 and sometimes by a large margin. 
 
This evidence is not conclusive because it only considers correlations. We are currently in the 
process of extending the analysis by using a framework borrowed from Propensity Score 
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Matching (PSM) analysis. Table 4 supports the hypothesis that movers did not choose 
boardinghouses on the basis of the profiles of the residents. Thus, if we treat boardinghouses as 
a random assignment, we can stratify the population of movers on the basis of territorial 
homogeneity of the destination boardinghouse. On average, if movers to a more homogeneous 
destination boardinghouse changed their voting records with respect to Congressmen living at the 
boardinghouse of origin who did not move, this would indicate a causal effect of the informal 
networks. A similar reasoning could be applied to see the effect of the “treatment on the treated”, 
i.e., relating the voting records of the movers with themselves before and after the move.   
 
Discussion 
 
Our analysis provides support for the hypothesis that boardinghouses formed informal networks 
that exerted political pressure on Congressmen. The mechanism behind this pressure was that 
homogeneity with respect to certain individual characteristics, such as living with other 
businessmen or college graduates, fostered the circulation of ideas that affected the political 
behavior of the boardinghouse residents. We singled out one particular dimension of 
homogeneity, that of being from either the South or the North. We noticed that in boardinghouses 
made up primarily of Southerners, the likelihood of voting with other people from the South on all 
issues increased significantly. The same is true for boardinghouses composed prevalently of 
Northerners, although the degree to which pressure impacted political behavior was lower 
compared to the other case. We take this finding to indicate that Congressmen discovered their 
common interests while living together. 
 
We developed a causal argument to show that informal networks caused the discovery of 
common interests rather than the other way around. It was not the case that Congressmen chose 
where to live on the basis of the profiles of the residents. It was instead more the case that 
Congressmen discovered similarities with the other Congressmen with whom they ended up living. 
This causal argument has important consequences for understanding the emergence of the North 
/ South divide that characterized American politics for much of the nineteenth century. Differently 
from countries in Europe, American parties did not operate as the primary institutions that allowed 
for the recognition and the consolidation of political interests and ideological positions. Instead, 
the evidence we amassed for our analysis suggests that at the roots of this process of mutual 
recognition and simplification of the ideological space stood the informal networks centered on 
boardinghouses.  
 
These conclusions need to be taken with a grain of salt. In part it is because we are still in the 
midst of coding some of the Congresses for which we have data and in part it is because we 
need to strengthen our causal argument. With respect to the first aspect, our expectations are 
that the inclusion of new data into the current framework will not upset our main conclusions. But 
as everyone that has done research knows very well, surprises are always possible. With respect 
to the second aspect, our goal is to extend the causal argument of the analysis as highlighted in 
the previous section. 
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Table	  1:	  Boardinghouse	  descriptive	  statistics.	  	  
Congress Years 
Members of 
Congress 
Number Living in 
Boardinghouses* 
Average Size of 
Boardinghouses* 
Number 
of Movers 
19 1825-1827 261 218 5.8 115 
20 1827-1829 261 182 5.9 102 
21 1829-1831 261 197 5.8 125 
22 1831-1833 261 209 6 145 
23      
24 1835 - 1837 294 239 6.3 128 
25      
26      
* This excludes all residences with fewer than 3 members   	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Table	  2:	  Probability	  of	  voting	  with	  the	  opposite	  side.	  22nd	  Congress,	  1st	  Session.	  
Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Intercept       
(Intercept):1 0.08693557  0.1864892  -0.6266386  
(Intercept):2 -1.96930291 *** -2.07358654 *** -2.20788175 *** 
       
Individual Variables       
Jackson Party 0.05325293 * 0.03780347  -0.01884552  
Slave State -0.01153478  0.05108163  0.28053513 *** 
Lawyer -0.00299088  0.01047968  -0.01230522  
Businessman -0.03649866  0.0102087  -0.00464193  
Military Experience 0.03665579  0.02849654  -0.00066678  
College Graduate -0.03133854  -0.00568743  -0.09881904 * 
New Congressman 0.05503858 * 0.00327421  -0.04301585  
Age 0.00068106  0.00025658  0.02161589  
Member of House 0.01310963  0.03454907  0.12426745  
       
Boardinghouse Variables       
Jackson Party   -0.00590448  -0.06406897  
Slave State   -0.07551656  0.17629156 *** 
Lawyer   -0.04225154  -0.04373594  
Businessman   -0.17636722  -0.21818696 * 
Military Experience   0.08126194  0.00767451  
College Graduate   -0.18340789 *** -0.33670124 *** 
New Congressman   0.15258846 *** 0.09771317  
Age   0.00209778  0.02164681 * 
Member of House   -0.12885376  -0.00988214  
Number of Inhabitants   -0.00168588  -0.01305187 *** 
       
Interactions       
Jackson Party     0.11836338  
Slave State     -0.50330988 *** 
Lawyer     0.03285951  
Businessman     0.04190875  
Military Experience     0.04694281  
College Graduate     0.20390514 * 
New Congressman     0.11504972  
Age     -0.00046862 * 
Member of House     -0.12769408  
Log-likelihood 300.0457  321.3874  348.9528  
Degrees of Freedom 401  391  382  
Note: * = .05, ** = .01, *** = .001      
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Figure	  1:	  Full	  Tobit	  model.	  Predicted	  probabilities.	  22nd	  Congress,	  1st	  Session.	  	  
	  
Note: Values set to modes or means, depending on whether binary or not, respectively 	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Table	  3:	  Interaction	  effects	  	  
Congress South % South in Boardinghouse Interaction 
19.1  -  
19.2   - 
20.1 +  - 
20.2 +  - 
21.1 +   
21.2 +  - 
22.1 + + - 
22.2 + + - 
23.1    
23.2    
24.1 +  - 
24.2 + + - 
NOTE: All (+) and (-) significant at .05 level  
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Table	  4:	  Voting	  correlations	  for	  movers	  	  
 1st Session Correlations 2nd Session Correlations  
Congress 
With actual 
board.house 
With future 
board.house 
With past 
board.house 
With current 
board.house Self-correlation 
19 0.51 0.4 0.5 0.69 0.71 
20 0.56 0.52 0.35 0.61 0.68 
21 0.5 0.46 0.48 0.7 0.35 
22 0.64 0.14 0.68 0.78 0.87 
23           
24 0.52 0.38 0.38 0.58 0.61 
25           
26           	  
 
 
 
